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STM:	A	Personal	Journey	
It	seems	to	be	common	wisdom	that	you	can’t	get	where	you’re	going	without	knowing	where	
you’ve	been.	In	researching	this	quote,	it	doesn’t	appear	to	be	attributed	to	any	one	
philosopher	in	particular,	and	some	suggest	that	it	is	a	variation	on	George	Santayana’s	quote	
that	those	unaware	of	history	are	destined	to	repeat	it.	
	
Regardless	of	the	source,	we	have	all	experienced	occasions	where	we	realized	the	value	of	
experience—whether	it	be	ours	individually	or	learning	from	others—in	reaching	our	
destination	or	at	least	in	charting	a	successful	journey.	
	
I	think	the	same	is	true	for	Space	Traffic	Management.	We	have	heard	many	speakers	present	
concepts	this	week	on	what	STM	as	a	destination	should	look	like.	And	it	is	important	to	clearly	
articulate	the	characteristics	of	that	destination,	so	that	we	might	recognize	it	when	we	get	
there.	But	there	is	also	value	in	understanding	how	we	got	to	where	we	are	and	what	that	
might	tell	us	about	how	to	get	to	our	ultimate	destination.	
	
So,	I’m	going	to	take	a	different	approach	to	this	keynote	than	most	of	you	might	expect.	Many	
of	you	know	me—some	for	many	years—and	realize	that	I	am	an	analyst	at	heart.	Give	me	data	
and	a	question	and	I	will	work	to	determine	what	the	data	tells	us.	It’s	not	my	story,	it’s	the	
data’s	story.	But	today	I’m	going	to	take	you	along	on	some	of	my	journey	and—as	we	say	in	
the	islands—talk	story.	
	
My	journey	started	with	an	awareness	of	the	consequences	of	losing	key	satellite	
communications	assets	in	the	early	days	after	the	September	11th	attacks.	I	had	just	taken	over	
leadership	of	the	AFSPC	Space	Analysis	Center	working	for	Gen	Eberhardt	and	Gen	DeKok	less	
than	two	weeks	before	the	attacks	and	soon	found	myself	in	the	position	of	being	responsible	
for	all	space-related	analysis	for	the	US	Air	Force.	
	
It	wasn’t	long	before	we	were	conducting	military	operations	in	both	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	and	
relying	heavily	on	satellite	communications	for	a	variety	of	missions	in	those	theaters.	
Unfortunately,	there	were	not	enough	dedicated	military	communications	satellites	to	meet	
the	need	and	pretty	quickly	we	were	depending	on	our	commercial	partners	to	provide	80-90%	
of	all	communications	to	these	theaters.	
	
While	our	comm	specialists	were	working	hard	to	protect	these	satellites	from	a	variety	of	
threats—such	as	jamming—I	realized	nobody	was	doing	anything	to	ensure	we	didn’t	
inadvertently	run	two	of	these	satellites	into	each	other	and	cause	a	catastrophe	in	GEO.	
	
Many	seemed	to	rely	on	the	‘big	sky’	theory	that	space	was	a	big	place	and	that	the	chances	of	
a	collision	were	miniscule.	Others	seemed	to	think	that	someone—notionally	the	US	military—
was	already	keeping	an	eye	out	for	such	situations	and	that	they	would	be	notified	in	the	event	
of	a	serious	close	approach.	The	only	reason	they	had	never	been	contacted	must	be	because	
there	had	never	been	a	need.	
	
To	ensure	I	fully	understood	the	situation,	I	called	a	meeting	of	key	players	at	HQ	AFSPC.	I	
began	by	asking	the	major	from	CMOC	what	they	would	do	if	two	military	communications	
satellites	got	too	close.	He	told	me	that	both	operators	would	be	contacted,	advised	of	the	
situation,	and	they	would	work	together	to	determine	who	would	take	whatever	action	was	
necessary.	
	
I	then	asked	what	would	happen	if	a	military	satellite	was	predicted	to	get	too	close	to	a	
commercial	satellite.	I	was	told	that	the	military	operator	would	be	informed	and	they	would	
take	whatever	action	was	required.	There	was	(apparently)	no	need	to	contact	the	commercial	
operator.	
	
Finally,	I	asked	what	would	happen	if	two	commercial	satellites	were	predicted	to	get	too	close.	
I	was	told	that	no	such	screenings	were	performed	because	“we	have	no	requirement.”	I	asked	
if	the	fact	that	more	than	80%	of	our	comm	going	into	two	major	theaters	might	be	using	those	
satellites	would	make	a	difference.	“Sir,	we	have	no	requirement.”	I	then	pointed	out	that	if	
those	two	satellites	collided,	they	would	produce	debris	that	would	drift	around	the	GEO	belt	
basically	forever,	risking	all	of	the	comm	satellites	we	depended	upon	and	asked	if	that	changed	
his	answer.	“Sir,	we	have	no	requirement.”	I	really	hated	that	answer.	
	
The	questions	weren’t	really	intended	for	the	major—who	was	intimately	familiar	with	
operations	in	CMOC—but	for	the	senior	staff	sitting	around	the	room.	Unfortunately,	most	of	
them	seemed	content	that	the	major	had	absolved	them	from	having	to	do	anything—because	
there	was	no	requirement.	
	
Not	content	to	simply	drop	the	problem,	I	talked	with	a	number	of	people	that	might	be	able	to	
help	develop	and	implement	some	type	of	solution.	After	all,	the	lives	of	American	service	
members	were	ultimately	at	risk.	I	was	told	that	any	solution	would	require	a	supercomputer,	
would	cost	millions	of	dollars,	and	likely	couldn’t	produce	and	distribute	results	on	a	time-scale	
that	would	be	operationally	usable.	These	assertions	proved	impossible	to	disprove	in	any	
meaningful	way	without	actually	doing	something—much	to	my	dismay.	
	
Soon	I	found	myself	on	a	different	path.	Toward	the	end	of	2003,	AGI	asked	me	to	come	work	
for	them	as	part	of	their	new	CSSI.	When	I	asked	what	I	was	supposed	to	do,	I	was	told	by	our	
CEO,	Paul	Graziani:	Just	go	do	something	good	for	the	community.	How	refreshing!	It	didn’t	
take	long	for	me	to	decide	what	I	wanted	to	do—to	address	the	conjunction	analysis	problem.	
	
I	had	a	vision	of	where	I	wanted	to	go	and	it	started	with	first	showing	the	art	of	the	possible	
and	then	identifying	the	shortcomings	and	developing	solutions	to	address	them…in	true	
analytical	fashion.	
	
The	first	step	was	to	disprove	the	assertions	about	why	we	couldn’t	do	anything.	I	wanted	to	
show	that	we	could	implement	a	low-cost,	effective	solution	using	standard	data	products	and	
COTS	hardware	and	software.	The	goal	was	to	use	a	standard	desktop	computer	(circa	2004),	
two-line	element	set	data	for	the	orbital	data,	and	a	customized	application	built	on	STK.	
	
Before	I	could	actually	implement	the	solution,	however,	I	managed	to	break	both	my	radius	
and	ulna	in	my	left	arm	on	a	training	ride	cycling	in	the	Garden	of	the	Gods.	I	found	myself	with	
my	arm	in	a	sling	and	on	major	pain	medication.	Still,	I	was	able	to	code	the	STK	application,	set	
up	the	process	to	automate	generation	of	the	data,	and	then	have	it	push	the	results	out	to	
CelesTrak	as	the	SOCRATES	service—Satellite	Orbital	Conjunction	Reports	Assessing	
Threatening	Encounters	in	Space—and	do	all	of	that	within	two	weeks.		
	
The	solution	cost	next	to	nothing—a	standard	desktop	computer	and	an	STK	license—and	could	
produce	results	screening	all	payloads	(~2,600)	against	the	entire	public	catalog	(~8,300)	in	
about	90	minutes.	Effectively,	I	had	done	that	with	one	arm	tied	behind	my	back	and	on	some	
serious	drugs.	And	we	all	know	that	retired	colonels	are	not	the	sharpest	tools	in	the	shed.	So	
much	for	why	we	couldn’t	do	anything.	
	
The	next	step	was	to	show	that	the	data—the	two-line	element	sets	or	TLEs—really	weren’t	up	
to	the	task.	It	wasn’t	that	TLEs	were	bad,	just	that	they	were	designed	to	do	something	else—to	
allow	‘fast’	computation	of	orbits	to	sufficient	accuracy	to	maintain	track	custody	of	objects	in	
space.	But	typical	accuracy	for	LEO	objects	was	2-3	km	and	for	GEO	was	more	like	20-30	km.		
	
That	was	more	than	adequate	for	a	sensor	to	find	an	object—if	it	hadn’t	maneuvered—but	
predicting	a	100-m	close	approach	with	an	uncertainty	of	±5	km	wasn’t	really	actionable	
information.	The	bottom	line	was	that	it	wasn’t	hard	to	demonstrate	the	accuracy	limitation	
using	a	number	of	objects	in	reference	orbits,	but	the	goal	wasn’t	to	simply	find	the	problems	
but	to	identify	and	implement	solutions.	
	
So,	we	started	with	the	hardest	part	of	the	problem	first.	It	turns	out	that	the	toughest	objects	
to	track	are	the	ones	that	maneuver.	Small	maneuvers	can	take	days	for	the	Joint	Space	
Operations	Center	(JSpOC)	to	detect	and	process.	In	the	meantime,	observations	are	collected	
and	processed	assuming	all	the	forces	acting	upon	the	satellite	are	known.	That	results	in	bad	
orbits	with	growing	errors.	
	
Large	maneuvers	can	be	even	worse,	because	a	satellite	might	diverge	from	its	original	orbit	so	
quickly	between	sensor	observations	that	it	no	longer	appears	to	be	the	same	object.	That	
requires	additional	(manual)	analysis	to	determine	that	a	maneuver	might	have	occurred	and	
then	try	to	associate	it	with	a	known	object—or	determine	whether	it	is	a	new	object.	
	
And,	of	course,	there	was	no	way	to	know	about	planned	(future)	maneuvers,	which	would	
dramatically	alter	the	circumstances	of	any	predicted	close	approach.	Or	was	there?	If	only	
there	were	someone	to	ask…	As	it	turns	out,	all	maneuvering	satellites	are	controlled	by	
operators	who	know	when	and	how	they	will	maneuver.	
	
SOCRATES	had	been	designed	functionally	to	allow	incremental	improvements	in	the	data.	
Obviously,	if	TLE	data	got	better,	so	would	the	conjunction	analysis.	But	what	if	we	just	asked	
satellite	operators	to	send	us	their	ephemeris	that	they	already	produced	as	part	of	their	flight	
dynamics	process?	We	would	know	about	their	planned	maneuvers	as	soon	as	they	were	
incorporated	and	would	get	updated	orbit	determination	results	as	soon	as	post-maneuver	
observations	were	processed.	
	
So,	I	started	with	Iridium	in	July	of	2007,	since	I	knew	a	number	of	the	flight	dynamics	personnel	
there.	But	we	never	got	far	because	their	support	contractor	insisted	their	orbital	ephemeris	
data	was	ITAR-protected.	This	was	an	omen	of	one	of	the	key	problems	we	face	even	today—
the	need	for	transparency	and	sharing	to	ensure	that	everyone	has	the	same	picture	of	the	
situation	to	minimize	the	chance	of	conflicting	analysis	producing	bad	results.	We’ll	talk	more	
on	this	later.	
	
Then,	Intelsat	contacted	me	and	asked	if	we	could	use	their	ephemeris	in	place	of	the	TLEs	in	
SOCRATES.	Somebody	else	got	it!	
	
We	started	by	getting	sample	ephemeris	data	from	Intelsat	and	making	sure	we	knew	how	to	
correctly	interpret	it.	While	having	a	standard	data	product	was	preferable,	each	operator	was	
tied	to	a	set	of	legacy	hardware	and	software	that	limited	their	flexibility.	We	wanted	to	set	up	
a	data	flow	that	received	the	original	data	product	and	then	converted	it	into	a	standard	data	
product	for	analysis.	That	meant	understanding	the	coordinate	frame,	time	system,	units,	and	
format	of	the	data.	
	
The	next	step	was	validation	to	ensure	that	understanding.	As	it	turned	out,	our	results	did	not	
match,	even	though	we	were	using	what	we	thought	was	the	same	coordinate	frame.	Once	I	
asked	Intelsat	to	define	their	coordinate	frame,	though,	it	became	clear	that	our	terminology	
did	not	match.	Adjusting	the	coordinate	frame	fixed	the	problem	and	reinforced	the	need	for	
the	initial	validation.	
	
And	recurring	validation	has	proven	to	be	key	to	producing	dependable	results,	because	
systems	can	get	out	of	whack	for	a	variety	of	reasons—whether	that’s	for	a	single	satellite	or	an	
entire	fleet.	And	we	regularly	find	and	report	errors	in	the	JSpOC	data	as	part	of	that	process,	
too,	to	help	ensure	the	best	overall	SSA	picture	for	the	community.	
	
After	spending	some	time	refining	and	testing	the	process	and	making	it	adaptable	to	different	
operators,	Intelsat	hosted	a	meeting	in	January	2008	to	advocate	our	new	SOCRATES-GEO	
service,	since	they	realized	that	knowing	only	the	position	of	their	satellites	was	not	going	to	be	
enough.	SES	and	Inmarsat	had	already	agreed	to	participate	and	Telesat	attended	to	play	devil’s	
advocate.	
	
Actually,	Telesat	raised	a	number	of	good	questions	that	helped	us	improve	our	service	and	by	
December	2008,	Telesat	had	joined	and	hosted	the	next	meeting	with	a	much	larger	
attendance.	We	were	getting	strong	interest	from	operators	around	the	world	for	the	need	to	
work	together	to	come	up	with	a	solution.	
	
In	February	2009,	the	dynamics	and	urgency	changed	when	IRIDIUM	33	and	COSMOS	2251	
collided	in	LEO,	producing	what	would	ultimately	be	determined	to	be	thousands	of	pieces	of	
debris	10	cm	or	larger.	JSpOC	was	unprepared	to	deal	with	the	sudden	demand	to	do	
something	and	held	a	meeting	in	May	to	explain	all	the	reasons	they	couldn’t.		
	
That	was	unfortunate,	since	I	had	visited	JSpOC	in	August	2008	to	offer	to	tailor	a	version	of	
SOCRATES	to	work	with	their	SP	data—at	no	cost	to	the	US	government,	since	it	was	considered	
by	AGI	as	maintenance	under	their	existing	license	of	STK.	JSpOC	politely	declined	the	offer.	The	
outcome	of	the	May	meeting	was	that	now	the	LEO	community	was	interested	in	developing	a	
SOCRATES-LEO	service,	as	well.	
	
As	a	result	of	the	collision,	there	was	a	more	widespread	appreciation	of	the	risks	of	
inadvertent	collisions	in	Earth	orbit	and	the	potential	consequences	for	current	and	future	
space	operations.	Satellite	operators,	in	particular,	understood	the	need	to	work	together	to	do	
something	now	instead	of	waiting	for	someone	to	implement	regulations	or	laws	that	could	
potentially	make	an	efficient,	collaborative	solution	more	difficult.	
	
Thus,	the	Space	Data	Association	(SDA)	was	born	and	now	counts	30	satellite	operators	from	
almost	as	many	countries—including	commercial,	civil,	and	military	entities—as	members.	The	
SDA	contracted	with	AGI	to	create	the	Space	Data	Center	(SDC)	to	perform	conjunction	analysis,	
data	validation,	and	value-added	analysis	of	JSpOC	products	to	ensure	safety	of	flight.	The	SDC	
screens	over	700	of	the	almost	2,000	operational	satellites	in	Earth	orbit	24/7	using	data	from	
SDA	members	and	the	JSpOC.	All	processes	are	fully	automated	and	standard	data	products	are	
provided	via	web	services	in	a	secure	environment.	
	
One	might	think	we	had	already	reached	the	end	of	our	journey.	But	let’s	take	a	moment	to	
consider	our	path.	Because	there	are	similarities	in	what	we	might	need	to	travel	safely	and	
what	we	need	to	do	to	ensure	safety	of	flight	in	space.	
	
Let’s	assume	we’re	driving	along	our	path	doing	some	space	trucking.	We	see	other	vehicles	
(cars,	trucks,	mopeds)	along	our	path	that	might	pose	a	safety	risk.	What	might	I	need	to	know	
to	minimize	that	risk?	For	starters,	I’d	like	to	be	able	predict	where	the	other	vehicles	might	be	
in	the	future.	Motor	vehicles,	like	satellites,	obey	certain	‘forces’.	One	of	those	‘forces’	is	that	
we	expect	the	vehicle	to	stay	on	the	road	and	that	they	are	traveling	at	or	near	the	speed	limit.	
	
If	I	knew	the	positions	of	the	other	vehicles	and	their	velocities,	I	could	predict	where	those	
vehicles	will	be	in	the	future—and	that	day	is	coming.	And	then	I	would	know	which	vehicles	
might	be	close	to	me	at	some	point—even	the	ones	in	crossing	traffic.		
	
But	what	about	the	uncertainty	of	that	estimate?	Even	without	precise	position	and	velocity	
today,	if	I’m	confident	the	other	driver	is	in	their	lane	and	I’m	in	mine,	we	regularly	pass	
closely—often	at	high	speed—without	a	problem.	But	if	all	I	know	is	that	we’re	both	on	the	
same	road,	deciding	whether	a	corrective	action	is	needed	and	whether	I	need	to	veer	left	or	
right	becomes	much	more	difficult.	
	
And	what	about	knowing	whether	the	other	driver	wants	to	turn?	Knowing	they	are	going	to	
turn	away	from	our	path	before	we	get	there	might	eliminate	what	otherwise	seemed	a	
problem.	And	turning	across	our	path	without	our	knowing	could	have	serious	consequences.	
	
What	else	might	I	need	to	know?	What	about	the	consequences	of	misjudging	a	close	
approach?	If	I’m	driving	a	tractor-trailer	and	misjudge	a	close	approach	with	someone	on	a	
moped,	I	might	not	be	too	concerned…	although	I’m	pretty	sure	the	moped	driver	would	feel	
differently!	But	if	I	misjudge	a	close	approach	with	another	tractor-trailer,	we	could	both	be	
killed	and	the	traffic	could	be	indefinitely	impacted	(remember,	there	are	currently	no	tow	
trucks	in	space).	
	
Basically,	we	need	to	know	all	objects’	states	(position	and	velocity),	their	intentions	(to	
maneuver),	and	the	uncertainty	associated	with	that	information.	We	also	need	to	know	the	
size	and	mass	of	each	object	to	assess	the	consequences,	since	miss	distance	or	even	
probability	of	collision	alone	is	not	sufficient.	
	
Nine	years	since	the	Iridium-Cosmos	collision,	what	do	we	have?	Only	the	US	government	
currently	provides	space	situational	awareness	(SSA)	data	to	the	public.	But	they	don’t	provide	
data	on	all	satellites.	They	don’t	provide	data	on	where	their	military	or	intelligence	satellites	
are—or	even	for	some	allies—even	though	other	countries	and	even	amateurs	can	see	them.	
They	also	don’t	provide	data	on	objects	that	they	don’t	know	where	they	came	from	(analyst	
sats).	As	a	satellite	operator,	not	knowing	there	is	a	satellite	near	you	will	not	prevent	a	
collision.	
	
They	don’t	provide	the	same	data	to	all	operators.	Some	get	TLEs	(not	really	suitable)	and	some	
get	SP	ephemeris.	These	paint	conflicting	pictures	of	what’s	going	on.	TLEs	have	no	uncertainty	
information.	SP	data	does,	but	only	the	data	provided	in	a	Conjunction	Data	Message	(CDM)	
contains	covariance	(usually).	But	you	only	get	a	CDM	when	JSpOC	thinks	there	is	a	close	
approach.	If	they	aren’t	screening	with	operator	ephemerides	and	a	satellite	has	recently	
maneuvered	or	will	soon,	operators	may	miss	actual	close	approaches	or	be	notified	on	non-
existent	ones.	There	is	rough	size	data	but	no	mass	data.	
	
The	result	is	a	mix	of	inconsistent	and	conflicting	portrayals	of	the	environment	that	jeopardizes	
not	only	safety	of	flight	for	individual	satellites,	but	potentially	the	overall	near-Earth	space	
environment.	How	could	this	be?	Doesn’t	the	US	government	want	to	keep	its	satellites	safe	
and	preserve	the	space	environment?	
	
The	problem	comes	down	to	transparency.	Having	a	military	organization	responsible	for	
collecting	all	observations	and	performing	conjunction	analysis	in	a	black	box	does	not	produce	
transparency	(or	trust).	In	reality,	it	is	unrealistic	to	expect	any	military	organization	to	be	
transparent	since	there	can	often	be	valid	reasons	to	withhold	information	that	might	
jeopardize	national	security,	such	as	capabilities	or	limitations	of	sensor	systems.	
	
So,	we’ve	reached	a	point	in	our	journey	where	we	realize	we	haven’t	yet	gotten	to	our	
destination	yet.	But	we	have	identified	a	number	of	obstacles	to	conducting	a	successful	
journey.	Which	road	do	we	choose	to	continue	our	journey?	
	
This	realization	is	what	has	driven	many	to	believe	that	the	only	possible	path	forward	is	one	
that	is	independent	of	any	reliance	on	military	systems—whether	those	are	sensor	networks	or	
those	processing	the	results—to	avoid	problems	with	transparency	or	changing	priorities.	And	
since	this	is	a	global	problem,	the	solution	must	be	international,	as	well.	
	
The	Space	Data	Association,	with	its	broad	international	collaboration,	has	acknowledged	this	
realization	by	deciding	to	renew	their	contract	for	the	Space	Data	Center	2.0,	which	will	rely	on	
observations	from	a	diverse	network	of	commercial	sensors	combined	with	state-of-the-art	
orbit	determination	from	AGI’s	ComSpOC.	
	
While	this	solution	doesn’t	represent	our	final	destination,	it	seems	the	only	viable	path	along	
our	journey	to	move	us	toward	that	eventual	destination.	We	hope	that	others	will	share	that	
vision	and	join	us	on	our	journey.	
	
It	is	time	we	move	forward	expeditiously,	since	failing	to	do	so	not	only	jeopardizes	thousands	
of	operational	satellites	and	the	missions	that	depend	upon	them,	but	the	near-Earth	space	
environment,	as	well.	And	we	must	move	forward	together,	since	even	one	misstep	by	a	single	
operator—working	with	incomplete	or	conflicting	information—puts	us	all	at	risk.	
	
So,	thank	you	for	your	time	today	and	letting	me	talk	story.	I	have	to	say	that	this	has	been	a	
remarkably	interesting	journey	so	far	and	I	look	forward	to	continuing	it	with	many	of	you	here	
today.	I	hope	that	some	of	you	in	the	audience	that	have	experience	in	STM	will	also	find	an	
opportunity	to	talk	story	about	your	own	journey,	so	that	we	may	all	develop	a	better	
appreciation	of	where	we’ve	been	and	how	that	might	help	us	chart	a	successful	path	to	
achieving	true	STM.	Thank	you.	
	
